Recession Probability
Every RecessionPulse article tagged “recession probability” — sorted newest first.
Recession Risk 47/100 — April 28, 2026
Near-term recession risk is ELEVATED but not high: the Sahm Rule is clearly not triggered (0.20 in March 2026), and layoffs remain low with initial jobless claims at 214k for the week ending April 18, 2026. The yield curve backdrop is non-recessionary in the classic sense (your 2s10s is positive/normal), and risk assets are still making new highs, which argues against an imminent 90-day contraction. However, forward-looking and “under-the-hood” signals are deteriorating: consumer sentiment is collapsing (UMich April final 49.8, down from 53.3 in March) and inflation expectations have jumped, while credit/household stress metrics (delinquencies, low savings) and select leading labor indicators (temps, quits) point to worsening momentum. The main tail risk over the next 90 days is an energy-driven growth shock from the Iran/Hormuz situation that lifts inflation and forces the Fed to stay restrictive longer even as real activity cools.
Recession Risk 44/100 — April 27, 2026
US recession risk over the next 90 days is ELEVATED but not high because the highest-weight real-time trigger (Sahm Rule) is still safely below recession territory (~0.27 vs 0.50 trigger), while weekly initial jobless claims remain low (214k for week ending Apr 18). The yield curve is no longer inverted (2s10s about +50 to +53 bps as of mid-April), which materially reduces near-term recession odds versus 2023–2024 style setups. However, leading indicators are flashing yellow-to-red: the Conference Board LEI has been weak enough to keep the “3Ds” recession signal in play, and forward-looking labor demand proxies (temporary help) are deteriorating. Net: the economy looks like it is skirting stall speed—more consistent with a growth scare/slowdown than a clean recession start inside 90 days, but downside tail risk is rising.
Recession Risk 47/100 — April 26, 2026
Over the next 90 days, recession risk is ELEVATED but not yet high because the labor-market trigger (Sahm Rule) remains well below the 0.5 threshold (about 0.20 as of March 2026) while initial claims are still low at 214k for the week ending April 18, 2026. The yield curve is no longer inverted (your 2s10s ~+0.51), which materially lowers near-term recession odds versus classic pre-recession setups. However, the Conference Board LEI has been falling for multiple months (six straight months through January 2026 per Conference Board technical notes), and several late-cycle internal labor signals (quits rate ~1.9–2.0% and temp help contraction) point to a deteriorating hiring engine that can turn quickly. Consumer sentiment is extremely weak (UMich final April 2026: 52.2; previous month 53.3), which raises downside risk to real consumption even if equities remain near highs.
Recession Risk 46/100 — April 25, 2026
Recession risk over the next 90 days is ELEVATED but not yet “high” because the labor market is still holding: initial jobless claims were 214k for the week ending April 18, 2026, and March payrolls rose +178k with unemployment at 4.3%. The highest-conviction near-term stabilizer is the Sahm Rule, which remains untriggered (your reading: 0.20), implying the economy is not in the classic fast-deterioration regime. Offsetting that, forward-looking and cyclically sensitive signals are flashing: Conference Board LEI remains negative with a 3Ds-style deterioration in your tracker, temp-help and freight are weak, consumer sentiment is depressed, and geopolitical energy shocks (Iran war; oil ~mid-$90s) are acting like a tax on demand. Financial conditions are not screaming crisis, but credit is drifting worse (HY OAS ~320 bps in your feed; recent FRED prints remain low-3%s in mid-April), and the steepening longer curve (2s30s) is consistent with a late-cycle “cuts are coming” narrative rather than renewed growth.
Recession Risk 44/100 — April 24, 2026
Near-term recession risk is elevated but not high over the next 90 days: the Sahm Rule remains clearly untriggered (0.20pp in Mar 2026), and layoffs remain muted with initial claims at 214K for the week ending Apr 18. The yield curve is no longer an immediate recession alarm (your 2s10s is positive), and March payrolls rose 178K with unemployment at 4.3%—consistent with a “slowdown, not contraction” baseline. The key offset is the Conference Board LEI: it fell again (down 0.1% in Jan 2026; -1.3% over the prior six months), which historically flags rising recession odds, and multiple cyclicals (temp help, freight, permits) are deteriorating in parallel. A second risk vector is inflation/oil-risk from the Iran conflict—recent headlines show renewed pressure in oil and broader uncertainty, raising the chance of a policy or confidence shock even if the labor market holds.
Recession Risk 44/100 — April 23, 2026
Near-term recession risk is elevated but not yet high because the labor-market trigger (Sahm Rule) is still clearly inactive and weekly jobless claims remain low and stable. The biggest macro red flag is the Conference Board LEI trend: it has been declining for multiple months and the 3D-style framework is flashing caution, consistent with a late-cycle slowdown signal. Manufacturing is not collapsing (ISM Manufacturing PMI was 52.7 in March), but the internal employment component remains contractionary (48.7), aligning with weakness in temp help and freight. The main swing factor over the next 90 days is whether the Iran-war energy shock re-accelerates inflation expectations and forces the Fed to stay restrictive (or even re-open hikes), which would tighten financial conditions into already-softening real-economy leading indicators.
Recession Risk 38/100 — April 22, 2026
Near-term (next 90 days) recession risk is MODERATE: the highest-weight trigger (Sahm Rule) is not close to firing (you show ~0.20–0.27), and the yield curve is decisively positive with the Fed holding the target range at 3.50%–3.75% as of the March 18, 2026 decision. Labor-market hard data remains consistent with expansion: March nonfarm payrolls rose +178k and initial claims were 207k for the week ending April 11, 2026. However, forward-looking demand signals are deteriorating—consumer sentiment has plunged to a preliminary 47.6 in early April (lowest since the late-1970s series began), housing permits are weak in your dashboard, and temp-help employment is in a pronounced downtrend. Credit is not flashing systemic stress (HY OAS ~2.84% on April 14), but the mix of weak confidence + soft goods/activity proxies raises the odds of a growth air-pocket rather than an imminent recession print in the next three months.
Recession Risk 37/100 — April 21, 2026
Recession risk over the next 90 days is MODERATE (37/100): the labor market is still holding (initial claims 207k for week ending Apr 11, 2026; March payrolls +178k and unemployment 4.3%), and financial conditions remain easy (Chicago Fed NFCI -0.47 for week ending Apr 10, 2026). The highest-probability near-term shock channel is inflation and real-income compression from the Iran/Strait of Hormuz energy shock (Brent roughly $95 on Apr 20–21, 2026), which can hit consumption and margins quickly. Traditional recession tripwires are not triggered: Sahm Rule is well below 0.50 (your reading 0.20) and the yield curve is positively sloped (2s10s about +0.5). Offsetting positives, multiple leading cyclical signals are deteriorating (temporary help, freight) and credit is no longer ultra-easy (HY OAS ~3% area), implying the expansion is increasingly fragile to an energy-price/credit-spread impulse.
Recession Risk 47/100 — April 20, 2026
Recession risk over the next 90 days is elevated but not high because the labor-market recession trigger is not close to firing: the Sahm Rule is ~0.20–0.27 and initial claims remain low (207k for the week ending April 11, 2026). ([apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/c3e29b5a86a350a27c3df9a4d88e5719?utm_source=openai)) The yield curve is no longer inverted (2s10s positive in your tracker), which is inconsistent with an imminent recession call. The dominant macro warning is forward-looking: the Conference Board LEI is still declining (down 0.1% in January 2026) and is explicitly flagged as not yet reflecting the Iran war shock—i.e., leading data are likely to worsen as energy/inflation pass-through hits. ([conference-board.org](https://www.conference-board.org/pdf_free/press/US%20LEI%20PRESS%20RELEASE-Mar%202026.pdf?utm_source=openai)) Inflation re-accelerated sharply in March (headline CPI +0.9% m/m; +3.3% y/y), increasing the probability the Fed stays restrictive longer, even as growth is already slowing. ([kiplinger.com](https://www.kiplinger.com/investing/economy/cpi-report-march-2026-what-to-expect?utm_source=openai))
Recession Risk 47/100 — April 19, 2026
Near-term recession risk is elevated but not yet high because the two most reliable real-time “tripwires” are not flashing: the Sahm Rule is 0.20 (well below the 0.50 trigger) and initial jobless claims are still low at 207K for the week ending April 11, 2026. The yield curve is positively sloped (2s10s roughly +50–53 bps in mid-April), which historically reduces imminent recession odds. However, forward-looking activity signals are deteriorating—Conference Board LEI fell in January 2026 and recession-warning frameworks tied to LEI breadth/duration remain a key concern—while cyclicals (temporary help and freight) are in “DANGER,” consistent with late-cycle labor demand softening. Risk is further amplified by weak consumer psychology (UMich sentiment plunged to 47.6 in early April with 1-year inflation expectations jumping to 4.8%), raising the probability of a demand shock if real incomes and credit conditions tighten simultaneously.
Recession Risk 44/100 — April 18, 2026
The 90-day recession risk is elevated but not high: the labor-market trigger set (Sahm Rule) remains clearly untriggered (0.20 vs 0.50), and weekly layoffs are still very low (initial claims 207k for the week ending April 11, 2026). The yield curve is no longer inverted (2s10s positive), removing one of the strongest medium-lead recession warnings. However, forward-looking growth momentum is soft: the Conference Board LEI is still contracting (down 0.1% in January 2026), real activity is near stall-speed, and key cyclical “early layoff” signals (temporary help and freight) are deteriorating. The Fed is on hold at a 3.50%–3.75% target range (March 18, 2026) amid heightened uncertainty, while consumer sentiment has collapsed to a record-low preliminary 47.6 in April—an acute risk to discretionary spending if it persists.
Recession Risk 47/100 — April 17, 2026
Over the next 90 days, recession risk is elevated but not yet high because the labor-market trigger (Sahm Rule) remains clearly untripped (~0.20–0.30 vs 0.50 trigger) while the yield curve is positive (2s10s roughly +0.5pp), both of which argue against an imminent, classic recession onset. The counterweight is the Conference Board LEI: it has been falling for six straight months through January 2026 and is down ~1.3% over the prior six months, consistent with a sustained forward-growth deterioration signal. Cyclical leading labor and goods indicators are flashing yellow/red—temporary help is contracting and freight is weak—while inflation re-accelerated sharply in March (CPI +0.9% m/m; 3.3% y/y), raising the risk that the Fed stays on hold longer and that real incomes/spending soften into early summer. Financial conditions are not tight (Chicago Fed NFCI about -0.47) and high-yield spreads are only modestly wider (HY OAS ~3.2%), so the most probable near-term path is a growth scare/soft patch rather than a definitive recession within 90 days.
Recession Risk 34/100 — April 15, 2026
The highest-weight real-time trigger (Sahm Rule) remains clearly untriggered (tracker ~0.20–0.30), and the yield curve has re-normalized with the 2s10s spread around +50–55 bps—both inconsistent with an imminent (next-90-days) recession. Labor market data has stabilized recently: March 2026 payrolls rose +178k and unemployment was 4.3%, while weekly claims remain low around ~200–220k, pointing to “slow hiring/low firing” rather than a downturn. Offsetting these supports, forward-looking cyclicals are flashing yellow/red (temp help down sharply; freight weakening), and consumer psychology is deteriorating rapidly—UMich preliminary April 2026 sentiment fell to 47.6 (record low) with 1-year inflation expectations jumping to 4.8%, a stagflationary mix that can choke off growth if it persists. Net: recession odds over the next 90 days are not high, but the balance of risks is drifting worse versus Q1 given weak confidence, soft goods/activity proxies, and a Fed that is not clearly pivoting dovish into the shock.
Recession Risk 38/100 — April 14, 2026
US recession risk over the next 90 days is **moderate**: the labor market is still holding (March payrolls +178k; unemployment 4.3%) and credit remains broadly calm (HY OAS ~3.05%). The highest-weight real-time trigger (Sahm Rule) is **not** close to firing (tracker shows ~0.20–0.30 vs 0.50 trigger), and the yield curve is **not inverted** (2s10s positive ~+50 bps). However, growth is running near stall speed (your tracker shows ~0.5% QoQ saar; GDPNow has been volatile and recently around low-single-digits) and several cyclicals are flashing yellow/red: temporary help and freight are contracting while consumer sentiment is extremely weak (Michigan final March 53.3; preliminary April reportedly a record low). Net: the economy is not in a recession signal regime yet, but the direction of travel is deteriorating and vulnerable to an energy/geopolitical shock turning into a hiring shock.
Recession Risk 38/100 — April 13, 2026
The highest-weight real-time trigger (Sahm Rule) remains clearly untriggered at ~0.20–0.27, consistent with no imminent recession signal from unemployment dynamics. The yield curve is no longer inverted (2s10s roughly +50 bps in your snapshot), and credit is still not pricing stress (HY OAS hovering around ~300 bps), which argues against a near-term recession within 90 days. Offsetting that, the goods side is deteriorating (temporary help and freight down, permits/starts soft) and sentiment is weak, while GDP growth is flirting with stall speed (your 0.5% QoQ SAAR / GDPNow ~1.8–2.1%). Net: slowdown risk is real, but the preponderance of top-tier recession triggers remains in the “not yet” camp for the next 90 days.
Recession Risk 44/100 — April 11, 2026
US recession risk over the next 90 days is elevated but not yet high: the labor market is still holding (initial claims 219K for week ending April 4, 2026; March payrolls +178K and unemployment 4.3%), and credit stress remains contained (HY OAS ~3.05% as of April 6, 2026). The biggest near-term macro threat is the Iran-war energy shock: March CPI rose 0.9% m/m and 3.3% y/y, driven by a 21% gasoline surge, which raises the odds the Fed stays restrictive or even re-opens the door to hikes. Real-side leading signals are split—ISM Manufacturing is back in expansion (52.7 in March) and LEI is only slightly down (-0.1% m/m in January), but goods-sensitive indicators (freight, temp help) are flashing late-cycle deterioration. Net: the base case is a growth slowdown/stall rather than an outright recession in 90 days, but the risk distribution is fat-tailed if energy/inflation re-accelerates and financial conditions tighten abruptly.
Recession Risk 43/100 — April 10, 2026
Recession risk over the next 90 days is elevated but not high: the labor market is slowing at the margin, yet it is not breaking. The Sahm Rule remains clearly untriggered (0.20) and weekly initial jobless claims remain low by historical standards (219K for week ending April 4, 2026), which argues against an imminent recession. The curve backdrop is not flashing the classic inversion signal (2s10s is positive in your tracker), but leading/cyclical internals are deteriorating—temporary help employment and freight are already in danger, consistent with a goods-side downturn. The key near-term macro risk is the Iran-war energy shock keeping inflation sticky and constraining the Fed’s ability to ease, which raises downside tail risk even as risk assets remain near highs.
Recession Risk 44/100 — April 9, 2026
Recession risk over the next 90 days is elevated but not high because the labor-market deterioration needed to trigger the most reliable real-time signals is not present: the Sahm Rule is still well below trigger and initial claims remain low (202,000 for the week ending March 28, 2026). However, the growth pulse is weak (near-stall GDP prints/nowcasts), consumer psychology is deteriorating (University of Michigan sentiment fell to 53.3 in final March 2026), and key leading-cycle labor/goods indicators (temporary help and freight) are already in “danger.” Financial conditions are not tight (Chicago Fed NFCI around -0.43 in late March), but market volatility is elevated and credit spreads have drifted wider, consistent with late-cycle fragility. The Fed is a swing factor: March 2026 minutes show some policymakers wanted to reintroduce the possibility of hikes, which raises downside tail risk if energy-driven inflation persists.
Recession Risk 47/100 — April 8, 2026
Recession risk over the next 90 days is ELEVATED but not yet high because the top real-time labor trigger (Sahm Rule) is not close to firing and weekly claims remain low, even as leading indicators deteriorate. The Conference Board LEI is still falling (down 0.1% in January 2026 to 97.5), keeping the “3Ds” style warning signal active, consistent with an economy losing forward momentum. Financial conditions are not outright restrictive (Chicago Fed NFCI around -0.43 on the late-March print) and the yield curve is positively sloped (2s10s about +52 bps per your tracker), which argues against an imminent recession call. The main near-term tail risk is a fast rollover in hiring (temporary help, quits rate) colliding with tighter credit to households (delinquencies rising, savings low) and renewed inflation/oil shocks that delay Fed easing.
Recession Risk 49/100 — April 7, 2026
The next-90-day recession risk is **elevated but not high**: the labor-market trigger most correlated with “real-time recession onset” (Sahm Rule) is not close to firing (tracker shows 0.20), and weekly layoffs remain very low (initial claims 202k for week ending March 28, 2026). However, forward-looking growth signals are deteriorating—Conference Board consumer expectations remain below the 80 recession-warning threshold (72 in February 2026) and the NY Fed DSGE model still assigns a ~36% recession probability over the next year (March 2026 release). The Fed cut/held policy in a more accommodative zone (target range 3.50%–3.75% as of March 18, 2026), but the Iran-war-driven oil shock (Brent >$110) is a near-term stagflation impulse that can compress real incomes and confidence. Net, the economy looks like “slow-growth + shock risk,” where a recession within 90 days is not the base case, but the distribution has fattened meaningfully.
Recession Risk 44/100 — April 6, 2026
US recession risk over the next 90 days is elevated but not high: labor market hard data remains firm while forward-looking and cyclically sensitive indicators are flashing caution. The Sahm Rule is not triggered (your read: 0.20), and initial jobless claims remain very low (202,000 for week ended March 28, 2026), both arguing against an imminent demand collapse. However, The Conference Board LEI has been falling for six consecutive months (latest available release: -0.1% m/m for January 2026, released March 19, 2026), and business-cycle-sensitive sentiment has deteriorated (UMich March 2026 sentiment 53.3). The Fed is holding policy steady at 3.50%–3.75% (March 18, 2026), which is supportive, but the risk is that persistent inflation/energy shocks and tightening real incomes push a late-spring growth air pocket.
Recession Risk 47/100 — April 5, 2026
Near-term recession risk over the next 90 days is elevated but not high because the labor-market trigger is not close: the Sahm Rule is ~0.27 as of the March 2026 update, well below the 0.50 recession threshold, and weekly initial claims just printed 202k for the week ending March 28, 2026. The yield curve is not flashing imminent recession: the 2s10s is positive and the Fed is holding policy steady at 3.50%–3.75% (March 17–18, 2026), which supports financial conditions remaining broadly workable. However, forward/leading data are deteriorating: temp help is in a sharp downtrend, freight is contracting, and consumer sentiment remains weak, consistent with a growth scare rather than a clean re-acceleration. The key risk is an adverse momentum shift from “low-hire/low-fire” into outright labor-market weakening, especially if the Iran-war energy shock and tighter credit transmission hit margins and hiring intentions simultaneously.
Recession Risk 38/100 — April 4, 2026
US recession risk over the next 90 days is MODERATE (score: 38) with a clear growth slowdown but insufficient labor-market deterioration to justify an elevated/high call. The Sahm Rule is still safely below trigger (0.27 as of Feb 2026), and weekly initial jobless claims remain low (202k for the week ending Mar 28, 2026), both arguing against an imminent recession. However, the economy is absorbing a large adverse energy shock tied to the Iran war, with US gasoline prices having moved above $4/gal and inflation risk rising into the April 10 CPI print window. Credit conditions are not flashing acute stress (HY OAS ~3.13% as of Mar 6, 2026), but several cyclical/leading components (temporary help, freight, weak sentiment) point to downside growth risk into late Q2.
Recession Risk 38/100 — April 3, 2026
Near-term recession risk over the next 90 days is MODERATE, not high, because the labor-market recession trigger is clearly not firing: the Sahm Rule is ~0.27 versus a 0.50 trigger, and weekly initial claims just printed 202k for the week ending March 28, 2026. The yield curve backdrop is not recessionary in the classic sense (2s10s is positive), and high-yield credit is not signaling acute stress (ICE BofA HY OAS ~3.27% on March 19, 2026). Offsetting these supports, several forward-looking cyclical indicators are deteriorating (temporary help down to ~2.447M; weak consumer sentiment; soft housing permits; freight weakness), which raises the odds of a growth scare but still falls short of “recession probable within 90 days.” The main macro tail risk is an oil/geopolitical-driven squeeze (Iran war) that could hit real incomes and confidence fast enough to spill into hiring by late Q2.
Recession Risk 34/100 — April 2, 2026
Near-term recession risk is MODERATE over the next 90 days: the labor market is still holding (initial claims around 210K for the week ending March 21, 2026) and the Sahm Rule remains well below the 0.50 trigger (0.27 as of Feb 2026, next update due April 3, 2026). The yield curve is no longer inverted in the key 2s10s segment (your tracker shows +0.51), which materially reduces imminent recession odds. Offsetting that, forward-looking/real-economy frictions are rising: temporary help is in DANGER, freight is in DANGER, consumer sentiment is weak, and the Iran-war oil shock is a clear late-Q1/early-Q2 growth and inflation headwind. With the Fed holding policy steady at 3.50%–3.75% on March 18, 2026 and emphasizing uncertainty, the risk is less an immediate recession and more a “soft patch” that could turn if labor cracks or credit spreads gap wider.
Recession Risk 52/100 — April 1, 2026
Recession risk over the next 90 days is ELEVATED but not yet high: the Sahm Rule remains clearly untriggered (~0.27), and initial jobless claims are still low (~210K, four-week avg ~210.5K), which argues against an imminent, broad-based labor-market break. The strongest negative macro signal is the Conference Board LEI: the index fell sharply in January 2026 (−1.3% m/m; ~−2.6% annualized), consistent with a leading-indicator recession warning. Labor conditions are deteriorating at the margin—February 2026 payrolls fell by 92K and unemployment rose to 4.4%—but the “low-hire, low-fire” pattern implies a slower-moving downturn unless a shock accelerates layoffs. The dominant near-term tail risk is the Iran-war energy shock (Brent >$100, U.S. gasoline >$4/gal reported March 31–April 1), which can tighten real incomes quickly and create policy constraint for the Fed if inflation re-accelerates.
Recession Risk 44/100 — March 31, 2026
Over the next 90 days, recession risk is **elevated but not high**, with labor-market “hard” data still inconsistent with an imminent downturn. The Sahm Rule remains safely below trigger (your read: 0.27), and initial jobless claims are still running near ~205k–210k in mid-to-late March 2026—levels historically consistent with continued expansion. However, growth is running near stall speed (your GDP ~0.7% QoQ saar; Atlanta Fed GDPNow around ~1.8% for 2026:Q1 as of March 13), and multiple forward/credit/vol signals (VIX ~31, HY OAS ~3.27%) are flashing stress. The dominant swing factor for the next 90 days is the inflation/growth shock channel from the Iran war and associated rates/term-premium volatility, which raises tail risk even if baseline activity holds.
Recession Risk 44/100 — March 30, 2026
Near-term recession risk is elevated but not high because the key real-time labor trigger remains untripped: the Sahm Rule is ~0.27 (Feb 2026), well below the 0.50 recession threshold. However, the growth impulse is deteriorating—February payrolls contracted by 92k and the unemployment rate has drifted up to 4.4%—while leading indicators are soft (Conference Board LEI down 0.1% in January 2026) and market-based stress is rising (VIX elevated; HY OAS ~3.21%). The yield curve is no longer inverted (2s10s positive), which reduces classic late-cycle “policy overtightening” recession odds, but credit + leading indicators are pointing to a meaningful slowdown. Base case for the next 90 days is “slowdown scare with rising recession tail risk,” not an outright recession call.
Recession Risk 38/100 — March 29, 2026
Recession risk over the next 90 days is MODERATE: the highest-weight real-time trigger (Sahm Rule) remains clearly untripped at 0.27, and the yield curve is positively sloped (2s10s about +56 bps), both inconsistent with an imminent recession. The labor market is cooling but not breaking—weekly initial claims were ~210k for the week ending March 21, 2026, still historically low even after a small uptick. The key tension is that February’s payrolls print was materially weak (-92k) with unemployment at 4.4%, while forward-looking/soft indicators are uneven (weak consumer sentiment; some housing softness) and credit spreads are only modestly elevated rather than signaling acute stress. Net: growth is slowing and the probability of a downside surprise has risen, but the preponderance of high-frequency recession triggers does not yet support a “high” 90-day call.
Recession Risk 44/100 — March 28, 2026
US recession risk over the next 90 days is elevated but not high: the Sahm Rule is not triggered (0.27 vs 0.50 trigger), and initial claims remain low (~210k for the week ending March 21, 2026). ([apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/a9e2c1400bf45f89217a0bf9aa7f4af2?utm_source=openai)) The yield curve is decisively positive (2s10s about +56 bps), and manufacturing is still in expansion with ISM Manufacturing PMI at 52.4 in February 2026. ([ismworld.org](https://www.ismworld.org/globalassets/pub/research-and-surveys/rob/pmi/blud202602pmi.pdf?utm_source=openai)) The main near-term concern is the Conference Board LEI continuing to fall (down 0.2% in January 2026; 6‑month momentum weakening), alongside clear softening in labor-market flow/quantity metrics (February payrolls -92k; unemployment 4.4%). ([conference-board.org](https://www.conference-board.org/pdf_free/press/US%20LEI%20Technical%20Notes-Feb%202026.pdf?utm_source=openai)) Net: absent a shock, this looks like a slowdown/fragile expansion rather than an imminent recession, but the leading indicators and hiring data argue for defensive readiness.
Recession Risk 47/100 — March 27, 2026
Recession risk over the next 90 days is elevated but not high because the labor-market trigger that most reliably flips in real time (Sahm Rule) remains safely below the threshold, and initial jobless claims are still low (210k for the week ending March 21, 2026). ([apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/a9e2c1400bf45f89217a0bf9aa7f4af2?utm_source=openai)) However, the Conference Board LEI “3Ds” recession signal is active in your tracker, temporary help employment is contracting, and February payrolls printed a large downside shock (-92k, unemployment 4.4%), raising the odds that weakness broadens into spring. ([axios.com](https://www.axios.com/2026/03/06/jobs-february-unemployment-trump?utm_source=openai)) Financial conditions are not yet crisis-like, but rising volatility and modestly wider HY spreads point to increasing fragility if growth or geopolitics worsen.
Recession Risk 46/100 — March 26, 2026
Base-case recession risk over the next 90 days is elevated but not high because the labor-market trigger set (Sahm Rule) is clearly not firing (0.27–0.30 vs 0.50) while initial claims remain low (~213k in the first week of March). The yield curve is no longer inverted (2s10s positive and steepening), which historically reduces near-term recession odds, but it also fits a late-cycle pattern where steepening occurs via front-end rate cuts as growth cools. The most credible warning cluster is leading indicators and cyclicals: Conference Board LEI is flagged as a recession-style signal in your tracker, temp-help employment is in sharp decline, and freight indicators are weakening—consistent with a goods-side slowdown. Financial conditions are not yet “stress” (HY OAS ~3.2%, NFCI still negative), but pockets of vulnerability (large bank unrealized losses, depleted ON RRP buffer, rising consumer delinquencies) raise tail-risk of a confidence/liquidity shock.
Recession Risk 44/100 — March 25, 2026
Recession risk over the next 90 days is elevated but not high because the labor-market trigger set remains unbroken: the Sahm Rule is still well below 0.50 (0.27 per your tracker) and initial claims remain low (205K for the week ending March 14, 2026). However, growth is visibly decelerating: February 2026 payrolls fell by 92,000 and the unemployment rate rose to 4.4%, while goods-side leading indicators (temporary help and freight) are in clear contraction. Financial conditions are not yet restrictive enough to force a near-term recession (Chicago Fed NFCI about -0.51 for the week ending March 6), but credit stress is creeping higher (HY OAS around the low-300s bps per your tracker) and volatility is elevated (VIX mid-20s). The main macro tail-risk is stagflationary pressure from the Iran war shock (notably a hot February PPI at +0.7% m/m), which can delay Fed easing and compress real activity simultaneously.
Recession Risk 38/100 — March 24, 2026
Near-term recession risk is MODERATE because the highest-weight real-time trigger (Sahm Rule) remains clearly untriggered at 0.27, while layoffs are still historically low with initial claims at 205k for the week ending March 14, 2026. The yield curve is no longer flashing recession (2s10s positive ~0.57% on March 12, 2026), which materially reduces imminent 90-day recession odds. However, growth is running close to stall speed (Atlanta Fed GDPNow for Q1 2026 downshifting to ~2.1% as of March 6, 2026) and labor demand is cooling (February 2026 payrolls fell ~92k and the unemployment rate rose to 4.4%). The balance of evidence points to a late-cycle slowdown and rising downside tail risk (temp help deterioration, weak sentiment, higher volatility), but not a high-probability recession within the next 90 days.
Recession Risk 44/100 — March 23, 2026
US recession risk over the next 90 days is ELEVATED but not high because the two most reliable real-time triggers (Sahm Rule and initial claims) are not flashing. The key deterioration is in forward-looking and cyclical indicators: Conference Board LEI has been negative with a recession-signal framework active, temporary help is in a sharp downswing, and freight is weak—classic late-cycle behavior. Labor market momentum has softened materially: February 2026 payrolls fell by 92,000 and unemployment rose to 4.4%, though weekly claims remain low near ~205K. Financial conditions are not crisis-like, but high yield spreads have drifted wider (~320 bps) and volatility is elevated, consistent with rising tail risk rather than imminent contraction.
Recession Risk 44/100 — March 22, 2026
Near-term recession risk is elevated but not high: the Sahm Rule remains well below trigger (0.27–0.30), and initial jobless claims are still low (205k for the week ending March 14, 2026). However, the labor market has clearly cooled—February payrolls fell by 92k and unemployment is 4.4%—and growth is flirting with stall speed with a weak Q1 trajectory. The yield curve signal is no longer screaming recession (2s10s is positive around 0.5–0.6%), but risk is shifting from a classic tightening-led recession to an energy-shock / margins-squeeze slowdown. The Iran-war-driven oil/gas spike is the key catalyst that can turn a soft patch into a contraction if it persists through April–May.
Recession Risk 44/100 — March 21, 2026
Recession risk over the next 90 days is elevated but not high because the highest-weight trigger (Sahm Rule) remains well below recession territory (0.27 vs a 0.50 trigger), and weekly layoffs remain contained (initial claims 205k for the week ending March 14, 2026). The key deterioration is in payroll momentum: February 2026 payrolls fell by 92,000 and unemployment rose to 4.4%, consistent with a cooling labor market rather than an outright collapse. Growth is near stall speed (your tracker shows ~0.7% QoQ SAAR), while consumer demand is soft at the margin (January 2026 retail sales -0.2% m/m). Financial conditions are not yet recessionary, but risk premia are no longer complacent (HY OAS ~3.09% on March 11, 2026; VIX elevated), and goods-side leading signals (temp help, freight, copper/gold) are flashing downside.
Recession Risk 44/100 — March 20, 2026
Over the next 90 days, recession risk is elevated but not yet high because the labor-market “hard trigger” (Sahm Rule) remains well below recession levels even as cyclical hiring is cracking. The key deterioration is in growth-sensitive leading signals (temporary help, freight, copper/gold) alongside a clear geopolitical oil shock from the Iran war that is tightening the inflation-growth tradeoff and raises the odds of a policy mistake. Credit is not flashing acute distress (HY OAS ~3.1% in early March) and financial conditions remain loose (Chicago Fed NFCI about -0.51), but the direction of travel is negative in hiring momentum and real activity proxies. Net: a slowdown is the base case, and the distribution is fat-tailed toward a sharper downside if energy stays high and layoffs broaden.
Recession Risk 44/100 — March 19, 2026
US recession risk over the next 90 days is ELEVATED but not yet high: the labor market is softening abruptly (February 2026 payrolls -92k; unemployment 4.4%), yet the Sahm Rule remains well below trigger (~0.30). Financial conditions are still loose (Chicago Fed NFCI about -0.5) and the yield curve is positively sloped (2s10s around +50 bps), both arguing against an imminent recession. The Conference Board LEI is still contracting (down 0.2% in the latest release) and several high-frequency cyclical signals (temporary help, freight) are deteriorating, consistent with a late-cycle slowdown rather than an immediate collapse. The Fed held policy steady at its March 18, 2026 meeting, reinforcing a “wait-and-see” stance amid heightened uncertainty tied to the Iran war and energy-price risk.
Recession Risk 52/100 — March 18, 2026
US recession risk over the next 90 days is ELEVATED but not yet high because the labor-trigger (Sahm Rule) is still clearly below recession-threshold and initial claims remain low (~213k for the week ending March 7). However, growth momentum is deteriorating at the margin: February payrolls fell by 92k and the unemployment rate rose to 4.4% (BLS release dated March 6, 2026), while forward-looking manufacturing signals are soft even as the headline ISM Manufacturing PMI remains in expansion (52.4 in February). The dominant near-term macro risk is an inflationary/geopolitical shock: the Iran war and Hormuz disruption has pushed oil above $100 and lifted US gasoline prices to the highest since 2023, raising the odds of a consumer-led slowdown and complicating Fed easing. Net: fundamentals are mixed (services still expanding), but leading indicators + energy shock skew risks meaningfully to the downside into late Q2 2026.
Recession Risk 44/100 — March 17, 2026
Near-term recession risk is elevated but not yet high: the Sahm Rule remains below trigger (0.27–0.30) and initial claims are still low at ~213k (week ending March 7). However, the labor market is losing momentum (Feb payrolls -92k; unemployment up to 4.4%), and growth is decelerating with Atlanta Fed GDPNow downshifting to ~2.1% (Mar 6) from ~3.0% (Mar 2). Financial conditions are still loose (Chicago Fed NFCI around -0.5), but credit is no longer improving (HY OAS drifting higher into the low-300s bps) and cyclical “early” indicators (temporary help, freight, copper/gold) are flashing risk. The dominant 90-day macro swing factor is the Iran war oil shock (Brent >$100 and gasoline price pressure), which raises stagflation risk and increases the odds of a confidence/spending air-pocket over the next 1–2 months.
Recession Risk 47/100 — March 16, 2026
Recession risk over the next 90 days is elevated but not high because the labor-market trigger (Sahm Rule) is still clearly untripped (0.27–0.30) and initial jobless claims remain low (~213K for the week ending March 7, 2026). The main deterioration is growth momentum: the February 2026 jobs report showed payrolls falling by 92,000 and the unemployment rate rising to 4.4%, consistent with a “low-hire, low-fire” stall rather than an outright contraction. Financial conditions are not signaling imminent recession (2s10s positive and Chicago Fed NFCI still loose), but risk appetite is more fragile (VIX elevated; HY spreads drifting wider). The balance of evidence points to a near-stall soft patch with a meaningful chance of tipping into recession if labor-market weakness broadens beyond temp help/freight and if credit spreads keep widening.
Recession Risk 44/100 — March 15, 2026
Recession risk over the next 90 days is elevated but not yet high: the Sahm Rule remains benign at 0.27 (Feb 2026), and the yield curve is positively sloped (10y–2y about +0.55% in early March). The key near-term deterioration is labor-market momentum—February payrolls fell by 92,000 and the unemployment rate rose to 4.4%—even as weekly initial claims remain low at 213,000 (week ending March 7). Manufacturing is expanding on the headline PMI (ISM Manufacturing PMI 52.4 in Feb 2026), but employment within manufacturing remains contractionary, consistent with your tracker’s weak temp-help and freight signals. Inflation is re-accelerating on the Fed’s preferred gauge (Jan 2026 PCE 2.8% YoY; core 3.1% YoY), which constrains how fast the Fed can provide insurance cuts if growth rolls over.
Recession Risk 44/100 — March 14, 2026
Near-term recession risk is elevated but not high because the core real-time labor triggers remain unbroken: the Sahm Rule is still well below its recession threshold (0.27 vs. 0.50) and initial jobless claims remain low at 213k for the week ending March 7, 2026. However, the February 2026 payrolls shock (-92k) alongside unemployment edging up to 4.4% indicates labor-market momentum is deteriorating faster than the claims data suggests. The yield curve is currently positively sloped (2s10s about +55 bps), which historically reduces immediate recession odds, but the economy is clearly in a late-cycle slowdown with multiple leading indicators flashing yellow/red (temp help and freight). Financial conditions are still easy (Chicago Fed NFCI -0.51 for the week ending March 6), so the base case is “slowdown + volatility,” not an imminent recession, but the downside tail is widening over the next 90 days.
Recession Risk 44/100 — March 13, 2026
Recession risk over the next 90 days is ELEVATED, driven primarily by a sudden deterioration in payroll momentum (February payrolls -92k; unemployment 4.4%) even as weekly layoffs remain low (initial claims 213k for week ending March 7). The Sahm Rule remains safely below trigger (0.27), and the 2s10s curve is positively sloped, which argues against an imminent recession call. However, cyclically sensitive activity signals (temporary help, freight weakness) plus weak household buffers (very low savings rate and rising delinquencies) raise the odds that a growth scare becomes self-reinforcing. Real activity nowcasts are not collapsing yet (Atlanta Fed GDPNow 2026:Q1 at 2.7% SAAR as of March 12, 2026), but the direction-of-travel in labor and goods is negative and consistent with a late-cycle slowdown.
Recession Risk 42/100 — March 12, 2026
Near-term recession risk has moved up to elevated primarily because the labor market is showing a clear downside inflection: February 2026 nonfarm payrolls fell by 92,000 and the unemployment rate rose to 4.4%. ([bls.gov](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_03062026.htm?utm_source=openai)) The Sahm Rule remains well below trigger (your read: 0.27–0.30), and the yield curve is no longer inverted (2s10s positive ~0.58), which argues against an imminent, broad-based recession in the next 90 days. Credit stress is not yet acute—high-yield OAS is ~3.06% as of March 10, 2026—but it is no longer tightening and is consistent with late-cycle conditions rather than mid-cycle expansion. ([fred.stlouisfed.org](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLH0A0HYM2?utm_source=openai)) The key tension is “services resilience” (ISM manufacturing still expansionary at 52.4) versus leading-cycle warning signals (temp help and freight weakness plus collapsing sentiment/expectations), which keeps the score above moderate. ([ismworld.org](https://www.ismworld.org/globalassets/pub/research-and-surveys/rob/pmi/blud202602pmi.pdf?utm_source=openai))
Recession Risk 44/100 — March 11, 2026
Near-term recession risk is elevated but not yet high because the highest-weight trigger (Sahm Rule) remains clearly untriggered (0.27), and the yield curve is currently positively sloped (2s10s ~+56 bps). The key deterioration is labor-market momentum: February 2026 payrolls fell by 92k and unemployment rose to 4.4%, following a very low 12‑month average jobs gain, consistent with a late-cycle “low-hire/low-fire” regime. Forward-looking growth signals are mixed—ISM Manufacturing remains in expansion (52.4 in February) while real-side goods indicators in your tracker (temp help, freight, copper/gold) are flashing recessionary warnings. Financial conditions are not tight, but risk is rising at the margin via widening high-yield spreads and elevated volatility, leaving the economy vulnerable to any additional shock in the next 90 days.
Recession Risk 44/100 — March 10, 2026
Recession risk over the next 90 days is elevated but not yet high: the labor market just printed a clear downside surprise (February payrolls -92k; unemployment 4.4%), while forward-looking/late-cycle indicators (temporary help, freight) are deteriorating. The most important real-time recession trigger (Sahm Rule) remains safely below threshold (~0.27–0.30), and the yield curve is meaningfully positive (2s10s roughly +60 bps), which argues against an imminent recession call. Manufacturing is still in expansion (ISM Manufacturing PMI 52.4 in February), but the trend is mixed and price pressures are re-accelerating (ISM Prices Paid 70.5), raising the odds of policy staying restrictive if inflation firms. Financial conditions are not flashing systemic stress (Chicago Fed NFCI remains loose/negative), yet credit is gradually tightening at the margin (HY OAS drifting higher; modest SLOOS tightening), leaving the economy vulnerable to a confidence or credit-event shock.
Recession Risk 44/100 — March 9, 2026
Near-term recession risk is elevated but not yet high because the highest-frequency labor stress triggers are not firing: the Sahm Rule remains well below the 0.50 trigger (0.27) and initial jobless claims are still low (~213K). However, the direction of travel has worsened materially in the last 1–2 weeks: February payrolls reportedly fell by 92K with unemployment at 4.4%, and growth tracking has cooled toward stall speed (Q4 2025 real GDP reported at 1.4% SAAR, and Q1 nowcasts have been drifting lower). Financial conditions and credit spreads remain relatively supportive (NFCI negative/loose; HY OAS ~300 bps), which argues against an imminent, self-reinforcing contraction inside 90 days. The key risk is a fast handoff from “low-hire/low-fire” to outright layoffs as temporary help, freight, and household buffers (low savings, rising delinquencies) deteriorate while policy uncertainty and tariffs keep inflation pressure elevated and constrain the Fed.
Recession Risk 38/100 — March 8, 2026
The highest-frequency labor stress triggers remain untripped: the Sahm Rule is still below recession threshold (your reading: 0.27), and initial jobless claims are holding at 213k for the week ending Feb 28, 2026. The key deterioration is in the monthly jobs pulse: February 2026 nonfarm payrolls fell by 92k and the unemployment rate rose to 4.4% (from 4.3%), consistent with a cooling, low-hire/low-fire labor market. Financial conditions are not signaling imminent recession: HY OAS is ~3.0% (2.98 on Feb 26) and Chicago Fed NFCI is around -0.56 (loose). Growth is the swing factor—real GDP was only 1.4% SAAR in Q4 2025 and confidence is fragile (Conference Board headline 91.2 in Feb; expectations still below the 80 “recession-signal” line), but these are not yet being confirmed by credit or layoffs.
Recession Risk 44/100 — March 7, 2026
Recession risk over the next 90 days is elevated but not yet high: the labor market just delivered a clear negative shock (Feb payrolls -92k; unemployment 4.4% on March 6, 2026), while the Sahm Rule (0.30) is moving in the wrong direction but remains well below the 0.50 trigger. The yield curve is decisively positive (2s10s roughly +0.55 to +0.60 recently), and credit stress is still contained (HY OAS ~1.9% on Feb 28, 2026 via FRED), which argues against an imminent, self-reinforcing downturn. Offsetting that, forward/early-cycle signals are deteriorating: temp help employment is contracting, goods-side activity (freight proxy) is weak, and household buffers look thin (savings rate ~3.6% with rising delinquencies). Net: the economy looks like it is late-cycle and decelerating, with a meaningful chance of a negative feedback loop if hiring remains soft through March and credit loosens from “tight” to “widening.”
Recession Risk 38/100 — March 6, 2026
Over the next 90 days, recession risk is MODERATE rather than elevated: the labor market is still not showing the kind of broad-based deterioration that typically precedes a near-term recession, with initial jobless claims holding at 213,000 for the week ending February 28, 2026. The Sahm Rule reading you provided (0.30) is elevated versus the expansion norm but remains well below the 0.50 recession-trigger threshold, and the 2s10s curve is positively sloped (~+0.56), reducing immediate recession odds. The main macro concern is the growing set of leading/early-cycle cracks—temporary help employment and freight weakness—alongside very weak household buffers (low savings and rising delinquencies) and rising risk of a policy-growth mismatch if inflation pressure persists. Net: not a “recession in the next 90 days” setup yet, but the distribution is fattening meaningfully toward a downside growth shock if labor softening accelerates into April–May.
Recession Risk 44/100 — March 5, 2026
US recession risk over the next 90 days is ELEVATED but not yet high because the labor market is still holding (initial claims ~212k for the week ending Feb. 21, 2026) and the yield curve is decisively positive (2s10s roughly +0.6% in late Feb 2026). The most important warning is the direction of labor-market momentum: the Sahm Rule is at 0.30 in January 2026 (not triggered, but drifting higher) alongside a clear deterioration in cyclicals like temporary help employment (about 2.48M in January 2026) and weak goods-side signals. Growth is near stall speed in the official data (Q4 2025 real GDP +1.4% SAAR), while confidence remains soft: Conference Board expectations stayed well below the 80 “recession-warning” threshold in February (72). Net-net, the economy looks late-cycle with rising fragility; recession is not the base case for the next 90 days, but the left tail is fattening.
Recession Risk 44/100 — March 4, 2026
Near-term (90-day) recession risk is elevated but not yet high: labor-market hard data remain resilient (initial claims ~212k for week ending Feb 21, 2026; continuing claims ~1.83M), and the yield curve is decisively positive (2s10s ~+0.58). The highest-signal recession trigger (Sahm Rule) is not close to tripping (0.30 vs 0.50 trigger), but leading-cycle employment gauges are deteriorating (temporary help deeply negative) and households look fragile (savings rate ~3.6%, rising delinquencies). Manufacturing activity is expanding (ISM PMI 52.4 in Feb 2026) yet employment within manufacturing remains in contraction (ISM employment 48.8) and input prices are surging (prices paid 70.5), setting up a stagflationary squeeze rather than a clean growth re-acceleration. The dominant incremental 48-hour risk shock is geopolitical: U.S.-Israel strikes on Iran have lifted oil prices materially and increased inflation uncertainty into the March 17–18, 2026 FOMC meeting, raising the odds that the Fed stays cautious even as growth decelerates.
Recession Risk 46/100 — March 3, 2026
Recession risk over the next 90 days is elevated but not high: labor market deterioration is not yet sharp enough to trip the Sahm Rule (0.30 in January 2026), while financial conditions and credit remain easy/tight-spread, respectively. The yield curve is no longer inverted (2s10s about +0.59), historically a major de-risking signal, but the steep 2s30s (+1.25) is consistent with a market anticipating further Fed easing if growth weakens. Real-economy cyclicals are flashing yellow-to-red (temporary help and freight down sharply), and growth is near stall-speed (Q4 2025 real GDP 1.4% SAAR) while household buffers are thin (saving rate ~3.6%). The near-term “tells” are whether unemployment continues drifting higher and whether claims/continuing claims inflect up from currently low levels (~212k initial claims as of the Feb 21, 2026 week).
Recession Risk 44/100 — March 2, 2026
US recession risk over the next 90 days is elevated but not high: the labor market is cooling yet still stable, while forward-looking real-economy signals (temporary help, freight, weak sentiment) are deteriorating. The Sahm Rule is at 0.30 as of January 2026—well below the 0.50 recession trigger—but the unemployment rate has drifted up to 4.3% and quits have cooled, consistent with a late-cycle labor regime. Financial conditions are not flashing stress: the 2s10s curve is positively sloped and high-yield spreads remain tight (ICE BofA HY OAS ~2.98% on Feb 26, 2026). The macro picture is a slowdown/near-stall (Q4 2025 real GDP 1.4% SAAR; Conference Board LEI still declining), implying downside asymmetry if labor or credit cracks.
Recession Risk 47/100 — March 1, 2026
Near-term recession risk is elevated but not high: the labor market is still holding (initial claims ~212K for week ending Feb 21, 2026), financial conditions and HY spreads remain benign, and the yield curve is decisively positive (~+60 bps on Feb 23, 2026). However, the Conference Board’s LEI is still flashing a recession signal (your tracker flags the 3Ds rule as triggered), and two classic early-cycle employment warnings—temporary help and freight—are already in DANGER, consistent with a late-cycle goods-side slowdown. The Sahm Rule reading (0.30) is not triggered, but it is uncomfortably elevated alongside a 4.3% unemployment rate and soft household buffers (3.6% savings rate; rising card delinquencies). Net: the economy is not “in” a 90-day recession base case, but the probability of a downside growth shock is meaningfully above normal.
Recession Risk 46/100 — February 28, 2026
US recession risk over the next 90 days is ELEVATED but not yet high because the labor-market “hard” data remains resilient even as forward-looking indicators deteriorate. The Sahm Rule is elevated but not triggered (0.30 vs the classic 0.50 trigger), consistent with an economy that is slowing rather than already contracting. The yield curve has normalized (2s10s around +0.59), which reduces near-term recession odds relative to a typical pre-recession inversion regime. Offsetting that, the Conference Board-style forward-looking signal set is weak (expectations remain below the 80 recession-warning threshold), and key cyclical labor leading indicators (temporary help) and goods activity proxies (freight) are flashing danger, implying downside risk is building into late Q1/early Q2.
Primary Recession Indicators: The Conflicting Signals of February 2026
The Sahm Rule sits at 0.30, yield curves have un-inverted, and the Conference Board LEI has triggered its 3Ds recession signal. We break down what every primary indicator is telling us right now.