Recession Analysis & Reports
Weekly recession indicator reports, deep-dive analyses, and real-time market commentary powered by data.
Recession Risk 34/100 — September 9, 2026
US recession risk over the next 90 days is MODERATE, not elevated, because the highest-signal labor triggers remain clearly untripped: the Sahm Rule is still negative (-0.07) and initial jobless claims are ~206k (week ending Aug 15), consistent with low layoff pressure. The yield curve has re-steepened (2s10s ~+41 bps as of Sept 8), removing the immediate “inversion” warning even if the prior inversion still argues for late-cycle risk. Forward growth tracking is not recessionary: Atlanta Fed GDPNow is ~4.7% SAAR for 2026Q3 (Sept 3 update), and the Conference Board LEI rose +0.2% in July. The main recession-leading deterioration is concentrated in goods/cyclicals (temporary help, freight, weak sentiment/low savings), which raises left-tail risk but lacks broad confirmation from credit spreads and aggregate labor data.
Recession Risk 34/100 — September 8, 2026
Recession risk over the next 90 days is MODERATE because the key real-time labor trigger is not flashing: the Sahm Rule remains below the 0.50 threshold (your tracker: -0.07) and initial jobless claims are still very low at 206k for the week ending Aug 29, 2026. The August 2026 jobs report showed +162k payrolls with unemployment steady at 4.1%, consistent with continued expansion rather than an imminent contraction. Financial conditions are loose (Chicago Fed NFCI about -0.56) and high-yield spreads are tight (~265 bps), which is not the setup that typically precedes a near-term recession. The main yellow flags are in cyclical goods and household buffers: temporary help and freight are in contractionary territory in your tracker, while consumer confidence/sentiment is weak and the personal savings rate is very low, raising vulnerability to any shock.
Recession Risk 34/100 — September 7, 2026
Near-term (next 90 days) recession risk is MODERATE because the highest-weight real-time labor triggers remain clearly untripped: the Sahm Rule is still negative (-0.07) and initial jobless claims are still low at 206k (week ending Aug 29, 2026). ([apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/3413da9e965fa7266cb62ea1d802badb?utm_source=openai)) Growth momentum in the real economy is not collapsing: Atlanta Fed GDPNow is tracking strong Q3 2026 real GDP growth at 4.7% (Sep 3, 2026), and ISM Manufacturing PMI remains expansionary at 54.6 in August 2026. ([atlantafed.org](https://www.atlantafed.org/research-and-data/data/gdpnow/current-and-past-gdpnow-commentaries?utm_source=openai)) The main deterioration is in forward-looking labor and household resilience (temporary help in sharp decline, low quits rate, very low savings, rising delinquencies) which raises the odds of a sharper slowdown if conditions tighten. Markets are pricing meaningful odds of a September hike, which is a key near-term swing factor for risk. ([rateprobability.com](https://rateprobability.com/fed?utm_source=openai))
Weekly Recession Report — September 6, 2026
This week's Recession Risk Report highlights a **two-speed U.S. economy**, with resilient labor and financial markets contrasted by cautionary signals in early-cycle labor and housing sectors. While the near-term recession outlook remains **contained**, the economy is showing signs of **slowing toward sub-trend growth**, increasing vulnerability to potential shocks.
Recession Risk 38/100 — September 6, 2026
Near-term recession risk is MODERATE over the next 90 days, driven by several soft-leading indicators but not confirmed by the highest-weight real-time recession triggers. The Sahm Rule remains safely below trigger (your reading: -0.07), and the labor market is still adding jobs: August 2026 nonfarm payrolls rose +162k with unemployment unchanged at 4.1% (unrounded 4.14%). Financial conditions remain easy (Chicago Fed NFCI about -0.56 as of 2026-08-28) and credit spreads are tight (HY OAS ~2.65% in early September 2026), which is inconsistent with an imminent recession. The main recessionary signal is concentrated in labor-market leading edges (temporary help down sharply) plus weak confidence/low savings and housing softness, which raises downside tail risk but is not yet broad-based.
Recession Risk 34/100 — September 5, 2026
US recession risk over the next 90 days is MODERATE, not elevated, because the highest-signal real-time labor triggers remain benign: the Sahm Rule is not close to a trigger (tracker shows -0.07) and weekly initial claims are still historically low at 206,000 (week ending August 29, 2026). The yield curve has re-steepened (2s10s about +0.41), which typically reduces near-term recession odds versus an active inversion, while financial conditions remain loose (Chicago Fed NFCI roughly -0.56). Growth nowcasts are not signaling an imminent stall: Atlanta Fed GDPNow is ~4.7% SAAR for 2026:Q3 as of September 3, 2026, and the NY Fed staff nowcast is ~2.2% for 2026:Q3. The main recession risk is a policy/geopolitical tightening impulse: the August 2026 payroll surprise (+162k; unemployment 4.1%) increases the probability the Fed hikes again soon, potentially colliding with household strain (very low savings rate and rising delinquencies in your tracker).
Recession Risk 38/100 — September 4, 2026
US recession risk over the next 90 days is MODERATE, driven by weakening labor-market leading indicators (notably temporary-help employment declines) and pockets of household stress, but held down by a non-triggered Sahm Rule, still-low jobless claims, and easy financial conditions. The Sahm Rule remains well below the 0.50 trigger (RecessionPulse shows -0.03), indicating the unemployment-rate upshift is not yet recessionary. The yield curve is now positively sloped (2s10s about +43 bps on Sep 3, 2026), which historically reduces near-term recession odds even if it follows a prior inversion. Growth nowcasts are not signaling contraction: Atlanta Fed GDPNow is a strong 4.7% for 2026Q3 as of Sep 3, while the NY Fed Staff Nowcast is 2.2% for 2026Q3, implying continued (if uneven) expansion.
Recession Risk 34/100 — September 3, 2026
US recession risk over the next 90 days is MODERATE, not elevated, because the highest-weight real-time trigger (Sahm Rule) remains firmly untriggered (about -0.03 vs 0.50 threshold) while layoffs are still low (initial claims ~203K). The yield curve is now positively sloped (2s10s about +0.40% as of Sep 1–2, 2026), which reduces near-term recession odds even though prior inversion history keeps medium-term risk non-zero. The Conference Board LEI is not flashing a classic contraction signal (July 2026 up +0.2% to 99.5), and manufacturing is not in outright recession territory (Aug 2026 ISM Manufacturing PMI still indicates expansion, with the manufacturing employment sub-index at 51.2). The main recession-adjacent risks are concentrated in late-cycle labor leading signals (temporary help down sharply in your tracker), weakening sentiment (Conference Board consumer confidence 89.4 in Aug 2026), and financial-system/fiscal fragilities that can turn a slowdown into a shock if liquidity tightens.
Recession Risk 34/100 — September 2, 2026
Near-term recession risk (next 90 days) is moderate, not elevated, because the highest-weight trigger (Sahm Rule) is firmly untriggered at -0.03 (July 2026 reading) and initial jobless claims remain exceptionally low at 203k for the week ending Aug 22, 2026 (reported Aug 27). The yield curve has re-steepened (2s10s about +41 bps as of Aug 31, 2026), and credit spreads remain tight (HY OAS roughly 260–263 bps in late August), both inconsistent with imminent recession. The main deterioration is in “soft” demand and cyclicals: University of Michigan consumer sentiment is weak at 55.2 (final Aug 2026), and leading labor/real-economy internals (temporary help and freight) are negative in your tracker. Growth nowcasts are not collapsing—Atlanta Fed GDPNow is 4.8% for 2026:Q3 as of Sep 1, 2026, while NY Fed Staff Nowcast is 2.2% for 2026:Q3 (Aug 28)—but Fed rhetoric has turned more hawkish, raising the risk of a policy-driven confidence shock rather than a classic credit/jobs-led recession.
Recession Risk 34/100 — September 1, 2026
US recession risk over the next 90 days is MODERATE, not elevated, because the highest-weight labor trigger (Sahm Rule) is still clearly untriggered and weekly layoffs remain low (initial claims ~203k as of the latest weekly release). The yield curve has re-steepened into positive territory (2s10s roughly +40 to +50 bps recently), which historically reduces near-term recession odds versus an active inversion regime. Forward-looking growth tracking is not collapsing: Atlanta Fed GDPNow for 2026:Q3 is running around the mid-4% area as of the late-August update, and the Conference Board LEI rose +0.2% in July 2026. Offsetting these supports, household confidence is weak (UMich sentiment 55.2 final for August 2026), goods-side signals are soft (freight/temps in “danger” in your tracker), and policy risk remains two-sided with July FOMC minutes flagging that “many” officials could favor higher rates if inflation fails to cool.
Recession Risk 34/100 — August 31, 2026
US recession risk over the next 90 days is MODERATE, not elevated, because the top real-time labor trigger (Sahm Rule) is clearly not flashing and claims remain very low. The yield curve has re-steepened (2s10s positive), credit is not signaling stress (HY OAS still tight), and financial conditions remain loose. The key tension is that the goods/industrial complex is deteriorating (freight soft, temp help down) while the consumer is fragile (Michigan sentiment weak and savings rate low), which can flip quickly if layoffs spread. Netting it out, the probability of a near-term recession is contained but rising at the margin due to late-cycle labor composition and household balance-sheet cushion erosion.
Weekly Recession Report — August 30, 2026
This week's recession report highlights a *mixed but increasingly fragile* economic landscape, with signs of *labor-market strength* and *easy financial conditions* countered by *late-cycle deterioration* in key sectors, raising concerns about *sub-trend growth* and *policy uncertainty* ahead of potential Fed rate hikes.
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