Recession Analysis & Reports
Weekly recession indicator reports, deep-dive analyses, and real-time market commentary powered by data.
Recession Risk 38/100 — August 8, 2026
Near-term recession risk is MODERATE, not elevated, because the highest-signal labor trigger (Sahm Rule) is not close to firing while initial jobless claims remain historically low (~199k for the week ending Aug 1, 2026). Recent labor-market momentum has clearly deteriorated—July payrolls reportedly fell by 23k and prior months were revised down—raising the probability of a demand-led slowdown, but the rise in unemployment has not been decisive and is being partly masked by a falling participation rate. Monetary policy is a mild headwind: the FOMC held the target range at 3.50%–3.75% on July 29, 2026, with a non-trivial hawkish faction still concerned about inflation. Financial conditions and credit are not behaving like a pre-recession regime (HY spreads remain tight and NFCI is easy), which caps 90-day recession odds despite weak household buffers (savings rate ~2.6%–2.7%) and housing softness.
Recession Risk 37/100 — August 7, 2026
US recession risk over the next 90 days is MODERATE, not high, because the highest-weight real-time trigger (Sahm Rule) is far from signaling recession and layoffs remain historically low (initial claims 199k for week ending Aug 1, 2026). The yield curve has re-steepened (2s10s positive in your tracker), and financial conditions are loose (Chicago Fed NFCI around -0.55 as of mid-July 2026), which is inconsistent with an imminent recession. However, growth is clearly decelerating (Q2 2026 GDP reported at 1.5% annualized), consumer confidence/sentiment is very weak, and several leading cyclical series you flagged (temporary help, freight, housing permits) are deteriorating, raising downside tail risk. Net: the economy looks like a late-cycle slowdown with labor-market insulation still intact, but vulnerability is rising if jobs weaken meaningfully.
Recession Risk 34/100 — August 6, 2026
Near-term recession risk (next 90 days) is MODERATE, not elevated, because the labor market is still not showing the fast deterioration that typically precedes recessions: initial jobless claims are ~197K and the unemployment rate is 4.2% as of the June 2026 jobs report. The Sahm Rule is not close to triggering (FRED series is still well below the 0.5 pp threshold through June 2026), which is the highest-weight real-time recession signal in this framework. Financial conditions and credit remain supportive (Chicago Fed NFCI is negative/loose per your tracker; high-yield spreads are still tight around ~2.8% OAS in late July 2026), which is inconsistent with an imminent demand-led contraction. The main recession-like warnings are concentrated in cyclicals (temporary help, freight, copper/gold) and a very pessimistic consumer backdrop, which argues for caution but not “recession probable within 90 days.”
Recession Risk 38/100 — August 5, 2026
US recession risk over the next 90 days is MODERATE, not imminent. The highest-weight real-time trigger (Sahm Rule) remains clearly untriggered (0.07 in your tracker), and layoffs remain historically low with initial claims at 197k for the week ending July 25, 2026. The yield curve has re-steepened (2s10s positive) and credit stress is absent with high-yield OAS still tight (~2.8% / ~279 bps as of July 24, 2026) alongside loose financial conditions (Chicago Fed NFCI about -0.55 as of July 17, 2026). Offsetting that, growth has slowed (Q2 2026 real GDP at 1.5% SAAR) and consumer psychology/cushion looks fragile (UMich sentiment ~49.5 and savings rate near multi-decade lows in your tracker), implying high sensitivity to any labor-market rollover or policy/geopolitical shock.
Recession Risk 38/100 — August 4, 2026
Near-term (90-day) recession risk is **moderate**: labor-market recession triggers remain clearly inactive, but a consumer-led growth scare is building. The Sahm Rule is 0.07 as of June 2026—far below the 0.50 recession trigger—while initial jobless claims are still low at ~197k with a ~203k four-week average (late July 2026). ([recessionpulse.com](https://recessionpulse.com/indicators/sahm-rule?utm_source=openai)) Financial conditions are not flashing stress (high-yield spreads remain tight in the ~2.8% area), and the ISM manufacturing PMI is still in expansion (June 2026: 53.3). ([fred.stlouisfed.org](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/data/BAMLH0A2HYB?utm_source=openai)) Offsetting those greens, household psychology and buffer stock are fragile (UMich sentiment ~49.5, savings rate very low), temp-help is declining, and growth is running below trend—raising the odds of an abrupt demand slowdown if shocks persist.
Recession Risk 34/100 — August 3, 2026
A US recession in the next 90 days is not the base case because the Sahm Rule remains far from triggering (0.07) and weekly initial jobless claims are still historically low (197k as of the week reported July 30, 2026). ([apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/99d765b2bbab7e278fb3eaed818d8319?utm_source=openai)) Financial conditions remain loose with high-yield spreads still tight (~2.72% OAS on July 6, 2026), which is inconsistent with imminent broad-based stress. ([fredaccount.stlouisfed.org](https://fredaccount.stlouisfed.org/public/dashboard/30917?utm_source=openai)) The main risk is a late-cycle consumption downshift: consumer sentiment is at crisis levels (49.5) while the personal saving buffer appears extremely thin, making the expansion vulnerable to any negative shock. ([data.sca.isr.umich.edu](https://data.sca.isr.umich.edu/survey.php?utm_source=openai)) Near-term growth is slow but positive; Atlanta Fed GDPNow for 2026:Q2 was tracking ~1.7% (July 16/17 update), not a collapse. ([atlantafed.org](https://www.atlantafed.org/research-and-data/data/gdpnow/current-and-past-gdpnow-commentaries?utm_source=openai))
Weekly Recession Report — August 2, 2026
This week's Recession Risk Report highlights a **two-speed U.S. economy**, with a resilient labor market and loose financial conditions, yet rising household stress and early-cycle recession indicators like temporary help employment and freight showing deterioration. Despite a slowdown in Q2 GDP to **1.5% SAAR**, stronger private demand signals suggest that the economy is still growing, not contracting.
Recession Risk 38/100 — August 2, 2026
US recession risk over the next 90 days is MODERATE (38/100): the labor market is still holding, financial conditions remain loose, and the Sahm Rule is far from triggering. The Fed held the federal funds target range at 3.50%–3.75% at the July 29, 2026 meeting, keeping policy restrictive-but-steady rather than tightening into weakness. Initial jobless claims for the week ending July 25, 2026 rose to 197,000—still historically low and not consistent with imminent broad layoffs. Offsetting these stabilizers, consumer sentiment is extremely weak (University of Michigan June final 49.5), and several cyclicals in “goods” activity (freight/temps) are flashing late-cycle deterioration that can propagate quickly if hiring rolls over.
Recession Risk 44/100 — August 1, 2026
US recession risk over the next 90 days is elevated but not high, with labor-market “hard” data still expansionary while multiple leading/early-cycle indicators are flashing late-cycle stress. The Sahm Rule is far below trigger (0.07), and weekly initial jobless claims remain historically low at 197k for the week ending July 25, 2026—both inconsistent with an imminent recession. However, the yield curve has re-steepened (2s10s positive) after inversion, consumer psychology is deeply depressed, and cyclical signalers (temporary help and freight) are weak, raising near-term downside tails. The Fed is holding policy at 3.50%–3.75% with visible internal dissents, which increases policy-risk volatility if inflation stays sticky and forces renewed tightening.
Recession Risk 38/100 — July 31, 2026
US recession risk over the next 90 days is MODERATE: the highest-weight real-time labor trigger (Sahm Rule) remains far from signaling recession (0.07), while weekly initial jobless claims are still very low at 197k for the week ending July 25, 2026. Financial conditions are loose (Chicago Fed NFCI -0.552 on July 17), and credit stress is muted with high-yield spreads still tight, which argues against an imminent downturn. Offsetting this, forward-looking labor and real-economy cyclical signals are deteriorating (temporary help in sharp decline, freight weak) and consumer psychology is depressed, increasing left-tail risk if jobs momentum slips. The Fed’s July 29, 2026 hold at ~3.6% with notable internal dissent (3 dissents favoring higher rates) keeps policy risk skewed hawkish, which raises the probability of a growth scare but not a near-term recession base case.
Recession Risk 34/100 — July 30, 2026
Near-term (next 90 days) recession risk is moderate, not elevated, because the labor-market trigger is decisively inactive: the Sahm Rule is well below the 0.50 threshold (your tracker: 0.07) and weekly initial claims are extremely low at 187k for the week ending July 18, 2026. ([apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/097a210a86c0bebcba2b2625cd04c2dc?utm_source=openai)) The yield curve has re-steepened (2s10s positive) and high-yield spreads remain tight (around ~2.8% OAS recently), both inconsistent with imminent recession dynamics. ([fred.stlouisfed.org](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/data/BAMLH0A0HYM2?utm_source=openai)) Policy is not adding fresh braking pressure right now: the Fed has been on hold at 3.50%–3.75% since December and stayed there through the July 28–29 meeting. ([axios.com](https://www.axios.com/2026/07/29/fed-warsh-rates-inflation?utm_source=openai)) The key offset is that “soft” and early-cycle signals are ugly—consumer sentiment around the mid-40s and clear weakening in temp help/freight—so a growth scare is plausible, but the hard coincident data do not yet validate a 90-day recession call. ([metatrader.com](https://www.metatrader.com/en/economic-calendar/united-states/michigan-consumer-sentiment?utm_source=openai))
Recession Risk 38/100 — July 29, 2026
Over the next 90 days, recession risk is **moderate**: the labor market is still tight in real time (initial claims fell to **187k** for the week ending **July 18, 2026**) and the Sahm Rule remains far from triggering (your reading **0.07**). Growth is slowing but not stalling—Atlanta Fed GDPNow for **2026:Q2** is about **1.7% SAAR** as of **July 17, 2026**, consistent with a decelerating-but-positive expansion. The main recession-warning cluster is in late-cycle soft data and goods-cycle proxies: consumer sentiment remains depressed (Michigan **49.5 in June 2026**, after **44.8 in May**) and manufacturing employment is still contracting even though the headline ISM manufacturing PMI stayed expansionary at **53.3 in June 2026**. Financial conditions and credit are not flashing stress (HY OAS roughly **279 bps** in late July), which argues against an imminent 90-day recession call.
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